unmanned aerial vehicles, control channels, security, opposition, cyber attack


Background. Protecting the data link of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is a top priority for countering attacks on UAVs. In this case, it should be taken into account that even the use of the most protected from the effects of deliberate interference types of modulation with spectrum spread does not guarantee the protection of such a channel.

Objective. The vulnerability of UAVs using cyber-attacks on a wireless channel is quite large, its study remains relevant, and therefore further development of complex effective means of countering such cyber-attacks is necessary, which is the purpose of this work. Moreover, the countermeasures presented in the work are based on the use of architectural solutions for building a UAV communication channel, which is different from traditional ones.

Methods. Structural-functional methods for constructing a secure wireless system of UAV communication channels are being investigated.

Results. A block diagram of the organization of UAV electronic countermeasures has been developed, which shows the data transmission channel from the UAV ground control station, the organization of the jamming channel, and the structure of the signal at the receiver input with all distortions and interference.

Interferences that can act as a signal of intentional interference from an electronic warfare station are presented and analysed.

An architectural solution is proposed using two channels in different frequency bands for the UAV control channel. A schematic structure of the organization of such a communication channel is presented. An expression is given for the margin of safety of a communication channel against a specific intentional interference. It is shown that the proposed architectural solution will have a similar effect when exposed to structured interference on the communication channel. In the case of the impact of imitation interference, the situation will be ambiguous, so it is very important to correctly determine the channel that is affected by intentional interference.

It is shown that to determine the presence of intentional interference, it is necessary to have at least one more degree of freedom, which is necessary for classifying such interference and effectively counteracting it. Such a degree of freedom can be achieved by additional dimensions or architectural solutions for building a communication system.

Conclusions. The types of intentional interference that can affect the UAV communication channel, the features of their application, and characteristics to ensure effective electronic protection are presented. Scenarios for counteracting the influence of attacks on UAV control channels are proposed. Scenarios with qualitative estimates are given, on the basis of which algorithms for detecting intentional interference and algorithms for counteracting the influence of such interference on the UAV communication channel can be built. It is assumed that the algorithms use averaged parameters, the length of the averaging interval is chosen as a multiple of the length of one data frame, which makes it possible to exclude from consideration fast fading in the communication channel that occurs in the case of frequency selective channels.


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